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SPEECH

OF

MR. M^cDUFFIE, OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

ON

THE TARIFF,

IN REPLY TO

MESSRS. EVANS AND HUNTINGTON:

DELIVERED

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

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SPEECH.

In the Senate, January 19, 1844—On the resolution of the Committee on Finance to postpone indefinitely the bill introduced by him for the reduction of the present tariff to the standard of the compromise act.

Mr. McDUFFIE, in reply to the arguments urged by Mr. EVANS and Mr. HUNTINGTON when the resolution was under discussion the day before, addressed the Senate as follows:

Mr. PRESIDENT: If one of the illustrious patriots who framed the constitution under which we are now deliberating, could have presented himself before us during the debate of yesterday, he would have been struck with utter astonishment to find the constitutional provision—however inadequate to its purpose—which was designed to protect the people of the United States from unjust and oppressive taxation, brought up as a barrier against relieving an indignant people from the most monstrous, unequal, and unjust system of taxation that ever stained the legislative annals of this country. In their great anxiety to save the people of the United States from unnecessary and excessive burdens, those illustrious patriots, who had been brought up in the school of the revolution, where they were taught to regard unconstitutional taxation as the greatest of all political evils, very naturally interposed every possible obstacle which might secure their posterity from so great a curse. For this purpose, they provided that no bill raising revenue should originate in the Senate; but that all such bills should originate in that house which more directly represented the people of the United States. Now, sir, I presume that the Senate of the United States will not be disposed to believe that the illustrious framers of this constitution meant to deal in mere idle words—that they would insert in the constitution of the United States a clause which had no practical utility. I ask you, then, what rational, what sensible meaning can be given to that clause, but that the object was to prevent this body from originating bills to raise revenue by the *imposition of taxes*? It was not that they wished to prevent you from putting money in the treasury, but to prevent you from taking money out of the pockets of the people. To raise revenue is, in itself, nothing; but to raise it by imposing excessive burdens on the people, was obviously the grievance they designed to prevent. One of the senators [Mr. HUNTINGTON] not now in his place, unintentionally, in answering an argument of my friend from New Hampshire, [Mr. WOODBURY,] let out what is the true view of this question. My friend

from New Hampshire had argued that, in various instances, the Senate of the United States had originated bills providing public revenue; giving, as an instance, laws imposing rates of postage. In answer to that, the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. HUNTINGTON] said (though the facts did not justify the argument) that this was not raising revenue by *imposing taxes*—clearly admitting the right of the Senate to originate bills raising revenue, which did not impose taxes. Suppose, Mr. President, that we had some mysterious power to raise revenue, without imposing pecuniary burdens on the people—suppose we are endowed with the power of necromancy, and could call down showers of gold from the heavens, or strike the earth with our magic wand, and cause it to throw up its hidden treasures: was it against that, or any similar mode of raising revenue, that our ancestors intended to guard? I repeat, that no sensible interpretation can be given to the clause under consideration, that does not look to the imposition of taxes as the sole subject of the restriction it imposes on the Senate. Regarding it in any other light, it would be a mere frivolous and unmeaning waste of words.

But, sir, let us look to the practical construction—to the true nature of the bill which I have had the honor to introduce to the Senate. Is it, in form or in substance, a bill for raising revenue? Is its object to raise revenue? Will its effect be to raise revenue by its own inherent vigor?—to use the words of the Senator from Connecticut. Assuredly not. It is a bill, on the contrary, totally and exclusively operating to reduce and repeal duties. It *imposes* no duties whatever. Its whole object is to mitigate the oppressive burdens of unjust taxation; and yet it is to be scouted out of the Senate by a plea to the jurisdiction; and the people are to be told we have not the power to originate a law for any such purpose! It is maintained, sir, by the senator from Connecticut, and also by the chairman of the Committee on Finance, that the duties to be hereafter collected, if this bill should become a law, will be imposed and collected by its authority. If that be true in any substantial sense, then, sir, I give up the question.

But how can a duty of 20 per cent. be collected under the authority of a law which repeals one-half the duty, and simply leaves the other half unrepealed? And what does the gentleman say of this operation? That, by leaving 20 per cent. unrepealed, you impose it! If to repeal a part of the duties makes the Senate responsible for imposing the remainder, I confess I do not understand the force of

language. I cannot comprehend the argument. It is an absolute puzzle, inverting the meaning of words, and confounding the substance of things; so that no analysis, of which it is susceptible, can render the solecism more obvious. It has a striking similarity to an argument once used by a sportsman, who bet \$20 on a horse race, and insisted, when the race went against him, that he had lost \$40. "For," said he, "I lost the \$20 I staked; but, if I had won the bet, I should have saved that, and gained \$20 more." That is to say, because he had not won the stake of his adversary, he had lost it! And so says the senator from Connecticut; because you have not repealed the remaining 20 per cent. of the duty imposed by the act of 1842, you have imposed it!

I did not intend to go into this branch of the subject, except to vindicate the constitution from a construction that would totally pervert the object of the clause in question.

The senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUCHANAN] inquired yesterday what would be the effect of a proposition here to amend this bill, by inserting a clause to raise the rate of duties. And it appeared that his mind labored under some doubt, whether such an amendment would not give this bill such a character that the Senate could not proceed with it—furnishing an argument that, because it would raise duties, it cannot originate here. The answer to that is very plain. If this were true, we could not report any bill in this House relative to the revenue, to which an amendment might not be offered, increasing duties, and thereby ousting the Senate of its jurisdiction. Suppose a bill, introduced on the subject of revenue, neither increasing nor diminishing duties, where the right of the Senate to originate is undoubted: would it not be competent for any senator to offer a clause increasing duties? I admit that such an amendment, if adopted, would not be consistent with the powers of this body; but I take it for granted that the Senate would reject it, on a question of order, or vote it down; for the obvious reason that it would be unconstitutional.

The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. HUNTINGTON] makes another supposition of a similar character—that this bill should pass here, be sent to the other House, and be there amended so as to increase, instead of reducing, duties. That House has the power of doing this: we have not. But the puzzle which embarrasses the gentleman is, how the President is to act upon it, when the bill is sent to him. He supposes the President might put his veto on the bill, and would not know in which House it originated, and where to return it. I make no doubt the President, overwhelmed as he is with difficulties, would be able to overcome this. The senator from Connecticut may dismiss all apprehensions on that subject. I will tell you, sir, where, in the case supposed, the bill would originate. It would originate here as a bill to reduce duties, and in the other House as a bill raising revenue, by increasing duties—a character which that House alone has a right to give it.

It appears to me obvious that the whole purpose of this clause in the constitution was to prevent the Senate of the United States from originating all bills imposing burdens on the people—an idea borrowed, no doubt, from the exclusive right of the British House of Commons to originate tax bills, there called money bills.

With regard to precedents on this subject, that of the compromise act—which is directly in point—seems to be regarded as of little weight; but I regard

it as one of the most solemn decisions on a question of order or of privilege ever made by the Senate.

You know, sir—we all know—the deep excitement which prevailed throughout the United States, and which was allayed by the bill introduced by a distinguished senator from Kentucky, [Mr. Clay,] to compromise the conflicting interests which then agitated the country. I then said—I have always said—that never, in the course of my political experience, had I known any public man display a more heroic moral courage than that Senator did on that memorable occasion. Sir, he was denounced by the manufacturers and their representatives here as a traitor who had betrayed them.

That compromise, sir—and I speak of it as a matter in which I had some agency—that compromise quieted, as I then hoped forever, the deep excitement which then agitated the whole Union. It was emphatically called the olive branch of peace; and I wish to God that that distinguished statesman, who had such an important agency in passing that measure, had remained here to vindicate and protect it from the foul and faithless mutilation it received, principally through the agency of his own political friends, in 1842.

But, sir, from considerations which, I doubt not, were sufficient to justify his course to his own mind, he retired from his seat in this body, and was not here when the tariff bill of 1842 was passed. And I regret to say, that I have lately seen published a letter from him, (which, in its general principles, perfectly accords with my own views of public policy and public justice,) concluding with the opinion that this act of 1842 is a very good measure upon the whole; that he has not examined it thoroughly; but thinks that some slight modifications might be made, which he is not prepared to point out without further examination. Now, sir, I like the text of that letter; but I cannot approve of this practical commentary. The former leads directly to the restitution of the compromise act, and to the overthrow of that formless monster, the act of 1842, which has supplanted it, and violated its solemn pledges. But, sir, it seems to be the desire of some senators that that monument of patriotic compromise and conciliation, should be stricken forever from the statute-book; and that the memory of it, if possible, should vanish from the minds of the present generation. The tariff of 1842 is certainly well adapted to effect this object. That measure, no doubt, occupies a distinguished place in the affections of the senator from Maine [Mr. EVANS.] He had an important and influential agency in its passage. I presume, as it is called a revenue law, it was referred to the Committee on Finance, over which he presides with so much distinction. He bears, therefore, in some sort, a parental relation to it; and I am not much surprised at this strong sentiment of regard manifested by that senator. It is well known that, of all the sentiments of the human heart, that which attaches a parent to his offspring is the strongest. But, notwithstanding all this, I should have hoped that the senator from Maine, in the spirit of the Roman patriot who offered up his son for the violated laws of his country, would have been prepared to make a similar offering, but for another sentiment still stronger than that to which I have alluded: it is this—that the intensity of a parent's affection is increased, instead of being diminished, by those very deformities, physical and moral, which excite the horror of every body else. Under the influence of this two-

fold sentiment, I do not wonder that the gentleman from Maine should be very unwilling to take off the veil which covers this gigantic infant in the cradle, and expose its horrible deformities. But, as the bill I have presented proposes to curtail these foul deformities—which that Senator no doubt regards as “fair proportions”—I proceed to examine and inspect his favorite offspring. And what is it but one of those moral monsters which had their origin in the genius of fabulous antiquity—in head and face, a man; body and tail, a fish.

It is entitled an act to *provide* revenue by imposing duties on imports; falsehood and deception stamped on the very front of it. A bill to *provide* revenue, which lays an average duty of 100 per cent. on several descriptions of imports that would come into the United States, to the amount of \$40,000,000 annually, under a revenue duty of 20 per cent., but which are now totally excluded by these enormous duties. I will not go into details; but state generally, that the duties on window glass range from 94 to 178 per cent., making an average of more than 150 per cent. on all descriptions; that the duties on many varieties of manufactured iron, embracing most of the tools and implements necessarily used on every farm and plantation in the country, are from 75 to 150 per cent. and more ad valorem; that the duty on raw iron, an article in universal use, is 112½ per cent.; that the duty on all those cotton manufactures which come under the *minimum* principle of valuation, (and which would be imported annually to the amount of ten or fifteen millions of dollars under a revenue duty of 20 per cent.,) range from 60 to 150 per cent. on their true value; that the duty on salt—an article of universal use, consumed in almost equal quantities by the rich and poor, and extensively consumed by every farmer, not only for family purposes, but ten times more extensively for his live stock—is 8 cents per bushel, (the article costing only 5 or 6 cents in Liverpool,) equal to 133½ per cent. on the original cost.

Now, sir, having adverted to the prominent features of the existing tariff, I propose to submit to the consideration of the Senate some general views with regard to the true character and extent of the revenue powers of this government; and it is not only a practical question of expediency, but a practical question of constitutional power, addressing itself to the conscience and judgment of every member of this body. What, then, is the extent and the limitation of the power conferred by that clause which authorizes Congress to raise revenue by the imposition of duties? A bill is reported from the Committee on Finance, and the title is “a bill to provide revenue for the support of the government.” To ascertain whether the bill itself conforms to the title, I ask what is the line which distinguishes revenue from protective duties? Is it practicable to draw such a line of discrimination with sufficient distinctness, to render it of any substantial utility? I think it is, sir; and I shall now endeavor to present to the Senate a rule on this subject, which I think every member will admit to be true in the abstract, whatever may be the difficulty in its practical application.

I hold, then, Mr. President, that under the power of imposing duties to raise revenue, there is this limitation imposed, not only by the constitution, but by every consideration of sound policy; and if it applies to one article imported, it equally applies to every other. The rule is this: a revenue duty must

be the lowest possible duty that will yield the largest, or the required amount of revenue. I repeat the proposition, sir, (and I ask the attention of the Senate to it,) that a revenue duty should be the lowest possible rate of imposition that would yield revenue required to support the government. I will illustrate this view. Every senator knows that any duty, however small, is, to a certain extent, a prohibitory duty. If you lay a duty of 10 per cent.; it excludes a very considerable amount of imports. If you lay a duty of 20 per cent., it excludes still more; and so on, progressively, till you reach the point of total prohibition. Now, sir, I will suppose (as I believe the truth to be) that a duty of 20 per cent. on cotton goods will yield as much revenue as any higher duty. To be more specific, I will assume that, under a revenue duty of 20 per cent. on foreign manufactured cottons, the amount of 20 millions would be imported into the United States, on which a duty of 20 per cent. would yield a revenue to the government of four millions of dollars; and that every senator shall be satisfied that a duty of 40 per cent. would yield precisely the same amount of revenue, and no more, prohibiting half the imports that would come in if the duty were only 20 per cent.

Now I ask the Senate which of these is the true revenue duty—that of 20 per cent., yielding four millions of revenue, or that of 40 per cent., yielding the same amount of revenue, and imposing double the amount of burdens on the people? It seems to me impossible that any human mind can hesitate between the two duties. It is self-evident, on the supposed hypothesis that 20 of the 40 per cent. duty could be imposed with no other design, certainly with no other effect, than to levy a contribution of 20 per cent. on the mass of the people, to supply a protective bounty of 20 per cent. to the manufacturers.

But I have conceded too much in the above hypothesis; for every practical merchant will sustain the assertion, that 20 per cent will yield more revenue than 40. But what do you say, sir, to that immense and incalculable amount of manufactures consumed principally by the middle and poorer classes of the people of the United States, upon which the duty is not merely 40, but 70, 80, 100, 120, 180 per cent. Sir, it is worth while to explain, a little in detail, the true character of the law which exhibits so fair and yet so false a front—promising revenue and producing prohibition. A large proportion of the prints and calicoes consumed in the United States, and of which every female of the middle and poorer classes is a consumer, cost, in Manchester, from six to twelve cents a yard; but they are charged with duties of from 75 to 150 per cent. by the ingenious contrivance of an artificial and false valuation. These articles are used by the wives and daughters of every farmer, planter, and laborer in the United States, who have no false pride to prevent it; and it is difficult to estimate the immense quantity which would be imported and consumed under a moderate duty. But when these articles come to the custom-house, the importer is required to pay from 2½ to 5 times their original cost; not to raise revenue, but to exclude them altogether, and give the domestic manufacturers the exclusive right to supply the market at their own prices.

But I now come, sir, to the question, Is this a revenue tariff? If the senate can be satisfied that an average rate of 20 per cent. duty would yield more revenue than the existing duties, can they, con-

sistently with their constitutional power—with any principle of sound policy—and without violating the principles of everlasting justice, permit their statute-book to be longer tarnished by a law imposing these unrighteous burdens, not for the legitimate purpose of raising revenue, but for taking money out of the pockets of one class of the community and putting it into those of another. But, sir, an idea has got abroad—and I am sorry to say that many of the friends of free trade have been deceived and betrayed by it, as many patriot-soldiers have been by the holding out of false colors—an idea has obtained currency, that, although you cannot impose duties for any other purpose but that of revenue, yet you may rightfully impose revenue duties, “with a wise discrimination, for the protection of domestic manufactures.” Sir, this is a part of the new system of tactics to which the manufacturers have found it necessary to resort. They say one thing, and mean another. What do they mean by “a wise discrimination?” Obviously a discrimination that will exclude imports, and diminish revenue. “A wise discrimination!” Pray what is your whole system of revenue—levied, as it is, exclusively from duties on imports—but an enormous discrimination in favor of the manufacturers and their confederates, and against all other classes?

A duty of 20 per cent. on foreign imports, while no corresponding duty is imposed upon the domestic manufactures with which the foreign come in competition, would be the most unequal system of taxation that exists in the whole civilized world, even if all protective duties were repealed. Yet we have made up our minds to submit to this system of unequal taxation, by which the whole manufacturing interest is not only excepted from taxes, but receives enormous bounties, by means of the duties imposed for revenue. And it is in the face of all this that statesmen gravely talk of revenue duties, with a wise discrimination in favor of domestic manufactures! I now propose to explain my view of “a wise discrimination!” It seems to be a very prevailing idea, that the South insists upon the system of horizontal duties. Now, sir, this is a very great mistake. For myself, I insist that discriminations are proper and necessary, with reference strictly to considerations of revenue. In my opinion, two kinds of discrimination belong properly to our system of revenue. The first is, to impose the highest rate of duties upon those imports which will yield a given amount of revenue with the least burden to the people. The second is, to impose the highest rate of duties upon articles consumed by the wealthy, and the lowest upon those consumed by the poor. Now, sir, the simple application of those two principles—the justice and policy of which would seem to be almost self-evident—would reverse the whole system of your legislation on this subject. For whereas you lay a duty of 150 per cent. on coarse fabrics, and only 30 per cent. on the finer qualities, I would impose a duty of 25 per cent. on the more costly fabrics, and only 15 upon the inferior qualities. This would be a discrimination that would increase revenue, and at the same time diminish the burdens of the poor instead of increasing the bounties of the rich.

The other kind of discrimination, having in view the largest revenue with the least burden, requires that a lower rate of duty should be imposed upon imported commodities which come in competition with domestic manufactures, than upon articles the like of which are not produced in the United States.

Fine silks, fine muslins, tea and coffee, are commodities not produced in the United States. If you impose a duty of 20 per cent. on twenty millions of these imports, it will yield a revenue of \$4,000,000, and impose just that burden, and no more, upon the people. But if you impose a duty of 20 per cent. on twenty millions of cotton manufacturers, you raise the same amount (\$4,000,000) of revenue, and impose a burden of \$12,000,000 on the people. This results from the fact that for every dollar's worth of manufactures you import, there are two dollars' worth of domestic manufactures of which the price is enhanced 20 per cent. by the duty imposed upon the foreign. All this would occur under a mere revenue system of duties. It will be perceived, then, that a revenue of \$4,000,000 raised by duties on fine silks, muslins, tea and coffee, would produce only one-third of the burden which would result from the same amount of revenue raised by duties on cotton manufactures.

There is another reason for this discrimination on revenue principles. A lower rate of duty will exclude imports of cotton manufactures, for which we have domestic substitutes, than will be required to exclude imports for which we have no substitutes. A duty of 40 per cent. would produce more revenue than 20, on fine silks, muslins, tea and coffee; but not half so much on the coarser cotton manufactures. So much for “a wise discrimination.”

I now beg leave to present an estimate which I have made, from a most careful examination of statistical returns, furnished by the manufacturers themselves to the officers who took the census of 1840, showing the aggregate burden imposed upon the people of the United States by the protective system, as it is embodied in the act of 1842. It is now ascertained at the treasury that the duty-paying imports under that act, the first year after its passage, amounted to only \$40,000,000.

There are annually made in the United States protected manufactures to the amount of about \$160,000,000. Of these, I estimate that about \$80,000,000 are now, and long have been, totally prohibited by high protective duties; and there is no standard for estimating the burden imposed upon the people of the United States by the duties which have excluded them. I assume, however, that \$80,000,000 of these manufactures come in competition with foreign imports.

The forty millions of imports, assuming the duties to average 40 per cent., will yield a revenue of \$16,000,000; while eighty millions of domestic manufactures, with which the foreign come in competition, are of course enhanced in price 40 per cent. by the import duties. What, then, is the burden imposed upon the country in the shape of bounties to home manufacturers? I do not say 40 per cent., because 20 per cent. on the import is an imposition of duty for revenue; but all beyond that is for protection, and extends to at least eighty millions of domestic manufactures, on which the protective duty is thirty-two millions, in addition to eight millions on the imports—making, in the whole, forty millions; while I think it reasonable to infer that the other eighty millions of articles totally prohibited are enhanced in price at least 10 per cent.; that is, by reduced duties, they would be reduced in price 10 per cent., amounting to an annual burden of \$8,000,000. Thus, in addition to the burden you impose to furnish revenue for the government,

you impose a burden of \$48,000,000 annually for the exclusive benefit of the manufacturers.

Now, sir, these are what I consider plain, practical deductions from authentic documents and elementary principles too clear to be controverted; and I feel assured that the burdens of the protective system are not over-estimated.

I shall now proceed to show what are the necessities of the manufacturers, for the enormous amount of bounties annually extorted from the mass of the people, by the tariff of 1842. I have made a careful calculation, showing the annual dividends received by the various descriptions of manufacturers, upon the capital invested, and you will be utterly astonished when I state the result. And I ask your attention while I show you the deplorable, distressed, and impoverished condition of these manufacturers, who came here in 1842, begging for more bounties. And I think I shall be able to show that one half of the 40 per cent. upon the whole amount of their productions, which the people of the United States annually contribute, is about the clear profit they put in their pockets. I will state the facts and principles of my calculation, in order that, if I have made any mistake, or left out any element in estimating the cost of production, their friends and representatives here may put me right.

The returns of the manufacturers, contained in the census of 1840, give the annual amount of their productions, the number of persons employed, and the amount of capital invested. I will state my mode of estimating their annual profits. In cotton manufactures, I have supposed the raw material constituted one-fourth of the price of the article manufactured. The number of persons employed, is stated by the manufacturers themselves. I have supposed that, large and small, they received half a dollar a day, as wages, or about \$150 a year each. I have allowed 10 per cent. for wear and tear of machinery—and I presume, one with another, that is a fair allowance—and I have added one-fourth to the permanent investment, as the circulating capital necessary to keep each establishment in operation. I will now state the results. The manufacturers of cotton in Massachusetts are now realizing an average profit of 35 per cent. per annum on the capital invested—permanent and circulating. But I have been informed that some of these manufacturers have actually divided 40 per cent. The cotton manufacturers of Massachusetts, however, realize larger profits than any others—the general average in all the States not exceeding 29 per cent. The profit on woollen manufactures, estimating the raw material at one-half the cost of manufacture, is 29 per cent. on the capital. The profit on cast and rolled iron (and I want the attention of my friend from Pennsylvania to what I state) is 34 per cent. on the invested capital. The number of tons of iron annually produced is stated in the returns, but not the value; and I have assumed, in my calculation, that it is worth the first cost of English iron, with the duty added, making about 2 cents a pound.

[Mr. BUCHANAN, from his seat, said: A great many of them have stopped within the last two years, notwithstanding.]

That (said Mr. McD.) is certainly distressing; but if they have long received dividends of 34 per cent., they can well afford to stop.

On salt, the profits on the capital invested amount to 20 per cent.; but the salt works in Virginia, if the returns are correct, are yielding the incredible profit of 85 per cent., upon the supposition that salt can be

sold for 25 cents a bushel at the works, which I have assumed, in the absence of positive information.

I have thus, Mr. President, attempted to exhibit the enormous burdens imposed on the people of the United States, and to show into whose pockets you are putting the enormous bounties derived from them. The grand result of the whole is, that contributions to the annual amount of \$32,000,000 beyond what would result from revenue duties, are extorted from the people by the act of 1842, which the bill on your table proposes to modify.

I come, now, Mr. President, to consider the arguments by which this system of protective duties, in the various stages of its progress from 1824 to the present time, has been supported. The principal argument addressed in the commencement to the national prejudices, and still urged by the supporters of the system is, that it protects domestic against foreign industry, as if it were a conflict between the pecuniary interests of this and foreign countries.

Now I think I can show that this is a total mistake, in point of fact; that there is no conflict at all between foreign and domestic industry; that foreign manufactures cannot come in competition with our own, but by means of the domestic productions of this country which are exchanged for them; and that the conflict is really not between foreign and domestic industry, but between one branch of domestic industry and another. What is it to the manufacturers here, that the manufacturers of Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham, shall make manufactures to an unlimited amount, and sell them at the lowest imaginable prices, if the domestic industry of the United States furnishes no productions to exchange for them? As long as they are the property of foreigners, that is, the productions of foreign industry, there can be no possible competition. When they are exchanged for our domestic productions, they become American property, and, to all intents and purposes, the productions of American industry; and it is at this precise point that the competition commences. It is the exporters of cotton, tobacco, rice, grain, and meat, and the consumers of the foreign manufactures obtained for them, who are the true competitors of our domestic manufacturers? It is upon these, and not upon foreigners, that the burden falls of that suicidal policy which regards foreign commerce as a national evil, and foreign nations as natural enemies.

Another prominent argument by which this system has been vindicated, is its tendency to increase the national independence; and, having maintained a war of seven years, full of privations and sacrifices, to achieve that great national blessing, it is not wonderful that the very words "national independence" should have a charm for every American heart. But, sir, there never was a more mischievous and fatal delusion than that which is propagated by those who maintain that foreign commerce diminishes the independence of the nations by whom it is carried on. It is an idea which originated in the dark ages, when nations were regarded as natural enemies, and plunder and rapine were the sources of national income; and has been propagated by ambitious conquerors, who would keep the nations of the earth involved in everlasting wars to gratify their lawless ambition. But, sir, the idea is as unfounded in truth as it has been fatal in its influence. Mutual dependence between nations, created by the exchanges of an extensive commercial intercourse, is the highest state of political inde-

pendence that can exist between the civilized nations of the earth. Mutual commercial dependence is mutual political independence. And I undertake to say, with all becoming solemnity, that God has not, in all his merciful dispensations, conferred any greater temporal blessing upon the human race than by that which has given rise to commercial intercourse among nations; substituting the mutual blessings of prosperity, peace, and good will, in place of the curses of war, desolation, and a mutual spirit of hatred and revenge. If I were inclined to doubt the existence of God, this dispensation alone would disabuse my mind, and reclaim me from the delusion. And, sir, it is this strong tie of mutual interests; this mutual bond, with heavy penalties, binding nations to keep the peace; this harbinger of civilization and herald of Christianity, that it is the avowed purpose and inevitable effect of this protective system to destroy. We have all learned, in our elementary school books, that the mutual wants and mutual dependence of individuals is the only foundation upon which the superstructure of the social state and of civil society could ever have been erected. But for that we should still have been savage barbarians. And it can hardly be doubted that these mutual wants, and this mutual dependence, are even more essential to the harmony and happiness of nations. He can hardly be regarded as a philanthropist or a Christian, who would intentionally counteract one of most beneficent ordinances of God.

These general remarks, Mr. President, are not submitted without a practical purpose, and as a mere idle display of philosophical speculation; but I make them in reference to a state of things now rapidly approaching, and which I might almost say is actually at hand. It cannot be disguised that it is the object of this policy—an object actually announced by its advocates—to prohibit entirely the importation of those foreign manufactures which come in competition with our own, and which are precisely those commodities which constitute almost exclusively the basis of our commerce with Great Britain, France, and the other manufacturing nations of Europe. Now, sir, to exclude these foreign manufactures, is to destroy that commerce which we now carry on with the great nations which produce them. This commerce, curtailed and mutilated as it has been for twenty years, is still extensive, and still supplies your government with the greater part of its revenue, as it has done from the beginning. Already you have destroyed one-half of it—comparing what it is with what it would have been, but for your protective and prohibitory policy, under which it is now rapidly verging to extinction. The manufacturing nations of Europe will not and cannot purchase our exports if we refuse to receive their productions in exchange for them. The consumption, then, to which your suicidal policy is approaching, is the total destruction of the commerce we now carry on with those nations of Europe with whom it is most peculiarly our interest to strengthen the ties of mutual interest, and consolidate the relations of national amity.

But while you are thus steadily advancing in the policy of destroying commerce, you are as steadily advancing, at the enormous expense of nine millions a year, in supporting and increasing your navy. Now, sir, as the protection of commerce is the only object which can justify the expense of maintaining a navy, if you destroy commerce, I say destroy the navy also. Let us become Chinese at once; not as

they are, but as they were. Let us shrink down into our shells, like terrapins, and draw in our heads at the approach of danger. It is idle mockery to send out your squadrons to scour the Pacific and the Mediterranean, when your whole commerce in those regions, including Peru, Chili, the Philippine islands, Africa, Turkey, and the Levant, does not exceed \$3,000,000, and while you are destroying a commerce fifty times the value, which requires no fleets to protect it. Against whom is a navy required to defend our Atlantic commerce? Against pirates? Against foreign powers? Against Great Britain?—for she is the raw-head and bloody-bones always invoked to silence opposition to wasteful expenditure? As a producer of the great staple on which it is mainly founded, I declare, with all solemnity, that I regard the Congress of the United States, as it has been constituted for the last twenty years, as more to be dreaded than all the powers of Europe combined, and all the pirates that ever infested the ocean.

Another argument by which this system is attempted to be sustained is, that it furnishes to the farmer a market for his agricultural commodities. I recollect that when I, last year, urged against this system its tendency to enhance the price of commodities which enter into the general consumption of farmers, the senator from Maine [Mr. EVANS] replied, True, it enhances the money price; but the farmer would be more than indemnified by getting a market for productions which otherwise he could not sell at all.

Now, this is a sound argument as far it goes; but how far does it go? The manufacturer furnishes a market for all the farmers within certain limits; but it is obvious that the circle must be very small. As far as it goes, it is a mutual monopoly. No one can compete with either the farmer or the manufacturer, because the expense of transportation prevents it. The manufacturer deals with the farmer, because he takes from him what he has to sell; and on the same principle the farmer deals with the manufacturer. So far, it is true, there is a mutual benefit. But both parties can stand alone. They are independent of government protection. Each party furnishes the other the best market; and that is free trade. Upon this principle, the salt works of Virginia defy all competition from foreign salt, to certain distances, depending on the cost of transportation. Now let me ask the senator from Maine to adopt the golden rule—to “do unto others as he would that others should do unto him.” Let me tell that senator that the agricultural producers of the South and Southwest stand precisely in the same relation to the manufacturers of Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham, as the farmers of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York do to the manufacturing establishments in their vicinity. Distance makes no difference. Our natural markets—derived, not from human charters, but from the providence of God—are Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, and the other manufacturing towns of Europe. When you cut us off from these, you perpetrate the same injustice as if you were to prohibit the Massachusetts farmer from dealing with a neighboring manufactory, by a prohibitory duty on their exchanges.

There is another argument, of which, I believe, the manufacturers keep a constant supply stereotyped for the use of their customers: that high duties upon foreign imports diminish, instead of enhancing, prices! Now, this is one of those incomprehensible paradoxes which they can successfully address only to the blind faith of their followers.

They gravely tell us that a revenue duty of 20 per cent., which will certainly enhance prices 20 per cent., will not enable them to maintain a competition with the rival manufacturers; but if you will add 20 per cent. more to the duty, they can then sell their manufactures cheaper than they could before! Exclude the competitor who undersells them, and they will immediately be able to undersell him! Now, sir, if high duties produce low prices, it would seem to follow that low duties would produce high prices; and the manufacturer should go strenuously for reduction.

But, if this argument must be gravely met, the answer is as simple as it is conclusive. If the manufacturer cannot obtain remunerating prices with a protection of 20 per cent., he certainly cannot afford to sell at lower prices; but, if he can afford to sell at lower prices, he certainly does not require more protection than 20 per cent. will afford him.

Another argument, Mr. President, which has been advanced, from a very high quarter, in favor of this system, is, that, by excluding foreign manufactures, we relieve ourselves from paying tribute to foreign nations. Yes, sir: a President of the United States, [Mr. J. Q. Adams,] who has filled various stations in the councils of this country, and has made a distinguished figure in them all, formally promulgated this extraordinary denunciation against foreign commerce, in one of his annual messages to Congress. Paying tribute to foreign nations! When we hear such doctrines from such high authority, we can scarcely wonder at the popular delusions which have so extensively prevailed on this subject. Now, sir, let us see in what this tribute consists. Foreign nations furnish us a market for domestic productions which we cannot sell at home, and they give us in exchange manufactures required for our consumption. But this is not all: they supply us with these manufactures 20, 30, and 40 per cent. cheaper than we can obtain them from our domestic manufacturers; and if that which constitutes the tribute, according to this paradoxical theory. Now, sir, with becoming deference, I think the tribute grows out of the very system here recommended, and goes to another quarter. That system compels us to pay an average of some 30 or 40 per cent. more for domestic manufactures than the price for which we could obtain the foreign; and common sense teaches that this is an unjust and oppressive tribute.

Another kindred fallacy has been recently propagated; and I am sorry to say, by a distinguished statesman, the acknowledged head of one of the great political parties of this country.

In the conclusion of the letter to which I have already alluded, he says, in substance, that it is the true policy of this country in regard to foreign commerce, "to sell as much and buy as little as possible." I confess, sir, I read this with surprise. It throws the exploded doctrine of the balance of trade quite into the shade. That would certainly be no very gainful commerce, in which we should give much and receive little. It is precisely what even Alexander Hamilton denominated "a vain attempt to sell every thing and buy nothing." If a horse jockey were advised to adopt a similar policy, and, in all his exchanges, to give a horse of great value, and receive one comparatively worthless, he would laugh in the face of the adviser. But it cannot be supposed that the distinguished writer of the letter in question meant so absurd a thing as to advise his countrymen to give to foreign nations more than we get from them. He must have intended to recommend the

policy of sending abroad as large an amount of exports as possible, and of receiving in return as small a proportion of consumable commodities, and as large a proportion of gold and silver as possible. This whole theory grows out of the popular fallacy, that money, which is the mere measure of the relative values of those consumable commodities which constitute national wealth, is itself not only the representative, but the essence of wealth. No nation upon earth could carry on a commerce, exchanging the productions of their industry for the precious metals for ten years, without sinking into poverty and wretchedness. Such a nation would truly represent the folly of a miser, who should perish for want of the common necessities of life, in the midst of his golden treasures.

This policy of selling much and buying little, so strongly exemplified in our protective system, is the very same in principle as that which impoverished Spain after the discovery of America. She carefully hoarded all the precious metals produced by her colonies, and prohibited its exportation by severe penal regulations. The result was, that she became the most impoverished nation in Europe. Now, by excluding foreign imports; by selling much and buying little; by refusing to take from the manufacturing nations of Europe the productions of their own industry for our great staples, you produce a forced importation of the precious metals, which adds not a cent to the substantial wealth of the country; and you prohibit the exportation, and of course, the profitable use of those metals, by means more effectual than the penal laws of Spain; that is, by prohibiting the importation of the foreign commodities, for which alone it is at all desirable, or to any extent possible, to exchange them. But, sir, I pass over several topics of less interest, and shall now proceed to present some views of this subject, which are to me of more intense and engrossing interest than any or all of those which I have hitherto presented. I allude to the unjust, unequal, and oppressive operation of this protective system, upon that portion of the United States of which the capital and industry are almost entirely employed in producing the staples of exportation. Now, sir, there are some five or six States in the north and northeast of this Union, largely engaged in the production of manufactures. On the other hand, there are some eight or nine States in the south and southwest, largely, and some of them almost exclusively, engaged in producing the great agricultural staples of exportation. And it so happens, that these foreign manufactures which we receive in exchange for our exports are precisely those which are manufactured most extensively in this country. It is the interest of the domestic manufacturers—at least as they understand it—not only to diminish, but to prohibit entirely the importation of these rival foreign manufactures. It is, on the contrary, the obvious interest of the producers of exports that there should be no restrictions at all on the importation of these natural exchanges, which they receive for the productions of their capital and labor. Here, then, it is not to be disguised, is a direct conflict of interest between two great branches of domestic industry. You cannot impose a duty upon one, however small and for whatever purpose, that will not unavoidably operate as a burden on that one and bounty to the other. The very act by which you confer a bounty upon one, imposes a coextensive burden on the other. If the government had no use for revenue, and our foreign trade was lito-

rally free from all duties, there would be a fair and equal competition between these rival branches of industry. Each class of producers would enjoy their natural rights, and neither could justly complain. But the moment the government imposes on one a revenue duty, (say 20 per cent.) however necessary and expedient, it unavoidably destroys this equality. A discrimination is made against one, and in favor of the other, to the precise amount of the duty. Now, what I venture to affirm, in this view of the subject, is, that the value of the staples of exportation, as compared with the value of domestic manufactures, is diminished in exact proportion to the duties imposed on the foreign manufactures received for those staples. It would seem to be almost a self-evident proposition, that the true measure of the value of our exports is the quantity of consumable commodities we can obtain in exchange for them. If there were no duties, for the annual cotton crop exported, (say 2,000,000 of bales,) the States that produced it could obtain, it shall be supposed, 2,000,000 of bales of manufactures. Now, when you impose an impost duty of 20 or 40 per cent. upon these manufactures, you diminish the number of these bales by as many as will be required to pay the duty—in the one case 400,000, leaving only 1,600,000; in the other 800,000, leaving only 1,200,000, as the actual intrinsic value of the cotton crop exported. If it be said that as much money can be obtained for the smaller number of bales, owing to their enhanced price, as for the whole two millions, it is a sufficient answer to say, that the exporting States, including planters and all other classes, consume very nearly the whole return received for their imports, either in imported manufactures or domestic manufactures equally enhanced by the duty.

But, sir, there is another view of this subject which leads us to the same result, though by a different process. And to this I invoke the earnest attention of the Senate, as the argument is not as obvious as I think it solid. When you originally impose, or when you increase, a duty upon foreign manufactures, (say 20 per cent.,) the first effect is to check importations of manufactures, and cause the importation of specie. This operation will continue until the price of domestic manufactures is so far enhanced that the foreign manufacture can be imported, paying the duty, with the ordinary mercantile profit. Now, this enhancement of the price of manufactures (foreign and domestic) in our market, as compared with their price in foreign markets, is neither more nor less than a corresponding depreciation of the value of money in this country, as compared with these commodities. The very reason which causes the depreciation of specie in this country, causes its appreciation in Europe, though not to the same extent. The whole result is, that, as Europe furnishes the great markets which consume six-sevenths of our cotton crop, the price of the whole crop is fixed here in a currency appreciated by our own importation of it. We, of course, obtain a lower price for our cotton in the United States, and that, too, in a depreciated currency.

Now, sir, when this system shall have reached the consummation which is so devoutly wished by its beneficiaries and supporters—when we “shall sell as much and buy as little as possible”—when we shall have realized the golden vision of “selling everything and buying nothing”—what will be the condition of the exporting States of this Union? Commerce between nations can rest upon no other foundation than a mutual exchange of the productions

of each other. When you have prohibited the importation of manufactures from Europe, you will have totally destroyed the demand for six-sevenths of our cotton, rendering it utterly valueless. I would as soon that you should nip every cotton plant in the bud; for then we should know our destiny, and be spared the labor of production.

Already, sir, have we fearful premonitions of this approaching catastrophe. With a delightful climate, a genial soil, as industrious a population as any on the face of the earth, and a staple which has contributed more than any other to clothe, with cheapness, the commercial nations of the world, we are steadily sinking, year after year, in all that constitutes the prosperity and greatness of States. Our efforts to counteract this downward course, serve but to sink us still deeper; and while our annual production has increased beyond example, its aggregate value has actually depreciated.

This, sir, is a question of life or death to the South and Southwest. The crisis approaches when it must be decided. It is in vain that we close our eyes against the approaching danger. You have already destroyed one half of our commerce by the steady progress of this fatal system for more than twenty years; and so long have we endured the oppression that we have almost lost the sense to feel, or the spirit to resist it. Sir, we are surrounded with imminent dangers; for, while a fanatical crusade is carried on against our institutions by affiliated societies, here and in Great Britain, you are doing all in your power to make it the interest of that country to co-operate with our domestic incendiaries, in the unrighteous work of destroying our great staple by destroying the means of producing it. Sir, ever since the tariff of 1828, I have regarded the exporting, the slave States of this Union, as being practically reduced to a state of colonial vassalage to the manufacturing States. And I feel authorized to add, that it is a much more oppressive state of tributary dependence than that which once bound us to great Britain! True, we were then compelled to trade with the mother country; but that country afforded us the best and cheapest market in the world; but now we are compelled, under a penalty of 40 per cent. on the amount of our annual productions, to trade with these master States, to the obvious and utter sacrifice of our vital interests and in gross violation of our natural and constitutional rights. Even if you were to come down to a revenue duty, with the discriminations I have stated, it would be the most unequal and oppressive, in its operation on the exporting States, of any revenue system in the world. No other nation ever attempted to throw the whole burden of taxation upon imports. Even in great Britain, the country which draws most largely from her imports, much the larger portion of her revenue is derived from her various internal taxes, direct and indirect.

So disguised and complicated are the bearings and operations of this system, that its true character can be in no way so clearly exposed as by comparative illustrations. By comparing this with what all must admit to be an equal system of taxation, its great inequality, as it affects the two great rival branches of exporting and manufacturing industry, will be apparent. I have heretofore stated that there were 160,000,000 of domestic manufactures annually produced in the United States, that come in competition, directly or remotely, with foreign imports. The amount of duty-paying imports last year was

\$40,000,000. The whole amount of these manufactured productions, imported and domestic, is \$200,000,000—all of them the productions of our domestic industry, equally entitled to the protection of the government, and equally liable, upon principles of equality, to pay the burdens of taxation. Suppose, then, that we should so far change our system as to impose an equal rate of duty upon all these manufactures—an impost duty of 10 per cent. on the one class, and an excise duty of the same rate on the other: this would yield a revenue of \$20,000,000—abundant for all the wants of the government; and the burden of it would be light, and, what is more important, equally distributed. Now, sir, I challenge the senator from Maine, or any one else, to point out a single objection to this system, upon the score of justice and equality. Sir, it cannot be done; and yet, in what striking contrast does it stand to your protective system! and in what deep colors does it exhibit the enormity of that system!

Mr. President, there yet remains one more comparative illustration, quite different in its character, to which I must ask the attention of the Senate. I shall suppose, then, that the catastrophe to which we are hastening, under this suicidal policy, has actually occurred, by the total destruction of that great branch of our foreign commerce which alone gives value to six-sevenths of our staples of exportation, and mainly supplies the government with revenue. What would be the inevitable result? Can it be supposed that we should still persevere in producing staples to perish on our hands? Certainly not. What, then, should we do? Why, sir, as we should have the slavish privilege of doing what you had not yet prohibited us from doing, we should follow even the example of our oppressors in all excepting their oppressions; and divert our capital and industry from agriculture to manufactures. For this change, let me tell you, we have great and abundant facilities, surpassing those of any part of the Union, in many respects. The raw material would be cheaper, for we should make our own supply, and take care to make none for our rivals and oppressors. Labor would be much cheaper; for, notwithstanding the absurd theories of political economists in Europe, who can know nothing about it, the labor of African slaves, trained, fed, and acclimated as ours are, is the cheapest labor in the world for its efficiency—not excepting that of the white slaves of India. We abound in water power and extensive regions of our poorest land; are covered by thick and lofty forests, furnishing inexhaustible resources for steam power. Let it be supposed, therefore, that some patriot, standing amidst the ruins of our commerce and prosperity—indignant at the oppression that had produced, and mortified at the patient acquiescence that had so long endured it, should say to his fellow-citizens and fellow-sufferers, Behold around you the monuments of oppression, in your dilapidated cities, and your desolated fields. There now remains to us only the poor privilege of making the most of our condition, by improving the means not yet destroyed by our oppressors. Abandon your fields, for their crops are blasted as they rise. Sell and sacrifice your lands, and appropriate the proceeds to the establishment of manufactories. As we have not had the spirit to resist oppression, let us at least have the wisdom to repair its ravages."

Now, sir, suppose that, conforming to this advice, our people cease to be planters and become manufacturers. Suppose further, sir, that it should be

found that, owing to the advantages just stated, the manufacturers of the South and Southwest should be able to undersell their former oppressors, as much as they now can, by sending their cotton abroad, and exchanging it for foreign manufactures (and this is no extravagant supposition, since their operatives would not cost, on an average, more than 12 cents a day;) would the manufacturers of the North and East stand this competition? Would they consent that their manufactures should not only be excluded from our markets, but driven back to the very gates of Lowell? We should have an empty treasury, for the revenue from imports would be almost destroyed. What would they say when you proposed to tax them? Suppose they should say, (as a distinguished representative of Massachusetts once said in the other House of Congress,) that the free labor of the North should never come into equal competition with the slave labor of the South. Suppose, further, that some member of Congress—first qualifying himself for such a task by forewearing his allegiance to the constitution and to the God of everlasting justice—should rise in his place, and propose a bill providing a discriminating duty of 40 per cent. upon all manufactures made by slave labor, and imposing no duty at all upon manufactures made by free labor: in what manner, Mr. President—I ask you in what manner would such a law be received by the people of the slaveholding States? Sir, they would rise up as one man, and, animated by one soul, would shake this Union to its deep foundations by the indignant voice of their awakened wrath. The spirits of our fathers would rise up from the grave, and, like the shade of the murdered king of Denmark urging his son to avenge the tarnished honor of his house, they would say, "If you have nature in you, bear it not."

And yet, Mr. President, such a proposition, monstrous and revolting as it would be, differs in no substantial particular, from the tariff of 1842. It is only necessary to tear off the disguises of this latter measure, to make the likeness manifest.

Mr. President, it has now been more than twenty years since I took my seat in the other branch of Congress; and during the whole period while I remained a member of that House, I can conscientiously say, I never contemplated this government but with the most indescribable feelings; for, as God is my judge, I can solemnly declare, as a citizen of South Carolina, that, in all that period—nearly a quarter of a century—I have never felt this government but by its oppressions. Day and night did I look forward, while a member of the other House, hoping for a day of redemption, neither seeking nor expecting any positive favors for my constituents; but demanding, in the name of justice and the constitution, that you should let them alone in the peaceful pursuits of their industry, and permit them to enjoy the fruits of that industry, undiminished by unjust and oppressive legislation. I never felt—I never could feel—any interest in the ambitious struggles of political parties for power and office, in comparison with that absorbing interest which I always felt in this great question. I have long regarded it as more important to that portion of the Union in which my destiny has been cast, than all the presidential elections that will ever take place. For myself, I would make almost any surrender of federal honors, if I had the power, to secure to my constituents "their long-lost rights."

And, sir, when these rights were restored by the compromise act of 1833, I was disposed to say,

"Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace." Satisfied with this adjustment, and disgusted with the miserable scramble for the emoluments of office, to which the great interests of the country were but too often sacrificed, I retired from the federal councils with the firm determination to spend the remainder of my days in peaceful retirement. And when that compromise was violated, I consented to come here from no earthly consideration but the hope of finding some agency in restoring it. And I now declare that, when the hope of accomplishing that great object shall desert me, I shall shake off the dust of my feet, and leave this hall forever. Sir, what may be the result of our deliberations on this question, I will not venture to predict; but I warn the senators who represent the manufacturing interest, here and elsewhere, that they have no small interest in the speedy adjustment of it. The day may not be distant when they will cease to control the legislation of this country so as to make it subservient to the interests of great capitalists. The eyes of the people of the West and Northwest are opened, and opening, to their true interests. They find, by sad experience, that every blow you strike at the prosperity of the southern and southwestern States inflicts an equal injury upon them. These staple States are their natural markets for their own great

staple, live stock—of which the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, raise, for distant markets, ten or twenty times the amount of their cotton-bagging and hemp; to say nothing of tobacco, breadstuffs, and (in the case of Tennessee) cotton, which they produce for foreign markets. Sir, I speak from practical knowledge when I say that a rise in cotton of two cents a pound will produce more than a corresponding rise in the price of live stock and bacon; and I do firmly believe that the passage of this bill would double the demand for live stock in South Carolina, and enhance the price at least 25 per cent.

However secure, therefore, gentlemen may feel, they may find that they stand on a sandy foundation; and I venture to predict that, in five years, the West will be as united in opposition to a protective tariff as the South. Sir, this monster of legislative injustice—this Mammon of eastern idolatry—can never be worshipped by an enlightened people, when stripped of his disguises: unveil his deformities, and his deluded followers, not less than his victims, will shrink back with abhorrence. Mr. President, I have humbly attempted to perform this office; and now, having done my duty, I leave the consequences to God.

Since the above speech was delivered, the following analysis of the rates of duty imposed by the act of 1842, carefully prepared by several merchants of high standing in Manchester and New York, has been received.

Width.	Width in inches.	Description.	Length.	Weight.		Price.		Average price.	Duty under present tariff.
			Yards.	lbs. oz.	lbs. oz.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	Per cent.
7-8th	24	Unbleached cotton goods.	29	2 8	2 10	4 0	3 1½	3 1	160
"	25	70 reed hand-loom supers.	29	3 8	3 10	3 9	3 0	3 10	130
"	26	do	29	3 12	4 0	4 0	4 4½	4 2	125
"	"	do	29	4 4	4 6	4 6	4 9	4 7	114
"	27	power-loom printers	29	4 8	4 12	4 7½	4 9	4 8	117
"	66	do	29	4 12	5 0	5 0	5 3	5 1	107
"	72	do	29	5 0	5 4	6 0	6 1½	6 0	95
"	"	do	29	5 4	5 8	6 3	6 9	6 6	90
"	"	do	29	5 8	6 2	6 6	7 1½	6 6	140
9-8th	33	hand-loom supers	25	3 12	4 0	4 0	4 1½	4 0	140
6-4th	44	do	25	5 4	5 6	5 4½	5 7½	5 6	140
8-4th	63	do	25	6 0	6 6	6 6	7 7½	7 0	160
6-4th	40	gray tanjibs	20	2 10	3 0	3 3	3 9	3 6	157
9-8th	34	power-loom printers	25	4 14	5 0	5 0	5 3	5 1	117
"	66	do	25	4 12	5 4	5 3	5 9	5 6	113
"	72	do	25	5 8	5 12	6 3	6 9	6 6	95
"	34	tape-end shirtings	37½	7 0	7 8	7 6	8 3	8 0	106
"	60	do	37½	7 4	8 12	8 0	8 9	8 4	112
"	66	do	37½	8 0	9 2	9 6	10 3	9 9	95
"	40	do	37½	8 8	9 2	9 9	10 3	10 0	104
"	72	do	37½	9 8	10 0	10 9	11 3	11 0	95
"	"	do	-	-	-	1 6	per ps. extra.	-	-
"	36	Long cloths	36	8 8	9 0	7 6	8 0	7 9	115
5-4th	39 a 40	Do	36	9 0	10 0	8 0	9 0	8 6	117
"	43 a 44	Do	36	10 0	11 0	9 0	10 0	9 6	115
"	24	Stouts or domestics, about	65	9 8	11 0	1½	a 0 1½	0 1½	133
"	27	Do	65	13 0	18 0	0 2½	a 0 2½	0 2½	100
"	30	Do	65	13 0	23 0	0 9½	a 0 3	0 3	100
"	33	Do	65	14 8	23 12	0 2½	a 0 3½	0 3½	82
"	36	Do	65	15 4	23 12	0 2½	a 0 3½	0 3½	115 a 86
"	40	Do	65	17 12	25 4	0 2½	a 0 3½	0 3½	134 a 92
"	44	Do	65	24 0	28 0	0 3½	a 0 4	0 4	98 a 92
<i>Printed cottons.</i>									
7-8th	22 a 26	Bengals and plates	28	-	-	4 6	a 8 0	-	162 a 90
"	"	Two and three colors	28	-	-	5 0	a 10 0	-	141 a 70
"	"	Navy blues	28	-	-	5 6	a 10 0	-	130 a 70
"	"	Two blues	28	-	-	5 9	a 10 3	-	123 a 70
"	26	Cambrics, three and four colors	28	-	-	6 0	a 13 0	-	135 a 58
"	"	Chintz	28	-	-	12 0	a 18 0	-	62 a 41

COTTON YARNS UNBLEACHED.

Mule.

	6a12	16	20	24	30	40	50	60	70	80	100
Low quality	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	6	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	7	8	8 $\frac{3}{4}$	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$
Second quality	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	6 $\frac{3}{4}$	7	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	21
Best quality	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	8 $\frac{3}{4}$	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	11	11 $\frac{1}{4}$	14	17	17 $\frac{1}{4}$	25
Average duty under present tariff	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.
	117	100	103	97	87	80	68	60	50	46	34

COTTON YARNS UNBLEACHED.

Medio Twist.

	40	50	60	70	80
Low quality	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	13	14 $\frac{1}{4}$	17 $\frac{1}{4}$	20 $\frac{1}{4}$
Best quality	12 $\frac{1}{4}$	15 $\frac{1}{4}$	17 $\frac{1}{4}$	21 $\frac{1}{4}$	25 $\frac{1}{4}$
Average duty under present tariff	p. c.	p. c.	p. c.	p. c.	p. c.
	67	53	43	40	33

COTTON YARNS UNBLEACHED.

Water Twist.

	6a12	16	20	24	35	40
Low quality	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	6 $\frac{3}{4}$	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	8 $\frac{3}{4}$	10 $\frac{1}{2}$
Second quality	6 $\frac{3}{4}$	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	9	11 $\frac{1}{2}$
Best quality	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	8 $\frac{3}{4}$	10	12 $\frac{1}{2}$
Average duty under present tariff	p. c.	p. c.	p. c.	p. c.	p. c.	p. c.
	111	103	97	90	81	65

NOTE.—The above is the entire price current, with the exception of a few Yorkshire articles.

N. B.—If these yarns were bleached, the duty would be 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ cents per lb. higher, or about 20 per cent. more: say, on No. 30, 108 per cent. duty.

Articles.	Width of cloth in inches.	Sterling cost per running yard.	Duty per running yard.	Per centage on sterling cost at \$4.84 per lb.
Moleskins, beaverteens, buffalo cloths, cords, or velveteens	27	5d.	7d.	87-100
	27	6	do	65 $\frac{1}{2}$
	27	7	do	56 $\frac{1}{2}$
	27	8	do	49 $\frac{1}{2}$
	27	9	do	43 $\frac{1}{2}$
	27	10	do	39 $\frac{1}{2}$
	27	11	do	35 $\frac{1}{2}$
	27	12	do	32 $\frac{1}{2}$
	27	13	do	30 $\frac{1}{2}$
	27	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	& upward	30
Velvets	20	6	5d. 83 $\frac{1}{2}$	48 $\frac{1}{2}$
	20	7	do	41 $\frac{1}{2}$
	20	8	do	36 $\frac{1}{2}$
	20	9	do	32 $\frac{1}{2}$
	20	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	& upward	30

N. B.—These goods (fustians) are charged 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ cents duty per square yard, being higher than any other cotton goods. They are used entirely by farmers and laborers, and the extra duty was put on at the suggestion of, and for the use of, one person, who is about the only manufacturer in the United States.

Table showing sterling cost of, and duty under present tariff, on printed or woven colored cotton handkerchiefs.

Sq. in.	Cost per doz.	Duty per ct.	Cost per doz.	Duty per ct.	Cost per doz.	Duty per ct.
	s. d.		s. d.		s. d.	
27	2 0	170	2 3	150	2 6	135
29	2 0	183	2 3	163	2 6	145
30	2 3	167	2 5	155	2 7	145
32	2 6	160	3 0	133	3 3	123
36	3 0	150	3 6	130	4 0	112

Table showing sterling cost of, and duty under present tariff, on colored cotton shawls.

Sq. in.	Cost per doz.	Duty per ct.	Cost per doz.	Duty per ct.	Cost per doz.	Duty per ct.
	s. d.		s. d.		s. d.	
50	6 0	105	7 0	90	8 0	78
54	7 0	96	8 0	84	9 0	75
62	8 0	96	9 0	86	10 0	77
72	10 0	90	11 0	82	12 0	75

Table showing sterling cost of, and duty under present tariff, on cotton and worsted manufactures.

	Cost per yd.	Duty per ct.
24-inch mousseline de laine - at	4d.	75
	5	60
	6	50
	7	45
	8	37 $\frac{1}{2}$
	5	106
42-inch Orleans cloths - at	6	87 $\frac{1}{2}$
	7	75
	8	65
	9	60
	10	52 $\frac{1}{2}$
	11	47 $\frac{1}{2}$
	12	43 $\frac{1}{2}$

Spun silk handkerchiefs and dress goods.

Spun silk is made from the waste of silk, and is carded and spun like cotton. Handkerchiefs and dresses to a large amount were annually imported until this tariff law passed. The cost of the yarn is about one-third to one-fourth of the price of train or organsine silk; yet goods made of it are charged \$2.50 the pound weight, or nearly one hundred per cent. on cost.

DUTIES ON FLANNELS.

	Cost.	Inches wide.	Pays.	Per cent.
Per piece of 46 yards	20s.	27	\$4.83	100
	21	27	4.83	95
	22	27	4.83	90
	23	23	5.01	90
	24	23	5.01	86
	25	23	5.01	82 $\frac{1}{2}$
	26	23	5.01	80
	27	29	5.18	79 $\frac{1}{2}$
	28	29	5.18	76 $\frac{1}{2}$
	29	29	5.18	74
	30	29	5.18	71
	31	29	5.18	69
	32	29	5.18	67
	33	29	5.18	65
	34	30	5.37	66 $\frac{1}{2}$
	36	30	5.37	61 $\frac{1}{2}$
	38	30	5.37	58 $\frac{1}{2}$
	40	30	5.37	55 $\frac{1}{2}$
	42	30	5.37	52 $\frac{1}{2}$
	44	30	5.37	50 $\frac{1}{2}$
	46	31	5.54	50
	48	31	5.54	47 $\frac{1}{2}$
	50	31	5.54	46
	52	31	5.54	44
	55	31	5.54	42
	59	32	5.72	40

DUTY ON BAIZES.

	Cost.	Inches wide.	Pays.	Per cent.
Bocking baize	6d.	42	\$16 33	130
	8	44	17 11	103
	10	46	17 89	89
	12	48	18 67	80
	14	48	18 67	66½
Printed floor-cloth baize	16	48	18 67	57½
	18	50	19 45	52½
	20	50	19 45	45½
	22	52	20 23	46
	24	52	20 23	42

Statement of duties on carpeting, by the tariff act of August 30, 1842.

Description.	Width, inches.	Price in Eng-land per running yard.	Value in cts., at \$4 24 per pound.	Duty per sq. yard.	Equal to ad valorem, per cent.
Fine ingrain	36	s. d. 1 5	34	35	103
Super ingrain	36	1 11	46	35	76
3-ply ingrain	36	3 0	73	65	89
Common Brussels	27	2 10	69	55	60
Super Brussels	27	3 8	89	55	46
Saxony	27	5 9, av.	139	65	35
Wilton	27	6 6, av.	167	65	31
Rugs of all kinds	-	-	-	-	40

Table of various articles manufactured of hemp, showing the cost, and the rate of duty under the present tariff.

Articles.	Cost.	Specific.	Duty.	P'r cent.
Cotton bagging, 44-in.	3¼d.	4 c. per sq. yd	\$1 68 per yd	70
Do do	4	do	do	65
Do do	4½	do	do	62
Gunny cloth, 45-inch, for bagging	3¾	5 c. per sq. yd	6½ per yd	90
Do do	4	do	do	84
Do do	4½	do	do	80
Bile rope, per lb.	2	4½ c. per lb.	4½ per lb.	115
Do do	2½	do	do	102
Do do	2¾	do	do	92
Canvass, 24-inch	6	7 c. per sq. yd	4 67 per yd	42
Do do	7	do	do	36
Do do	8	do	do	32
Do do	10	do	do	25
Twine, India	4	6 c. per lb.	6½ per lb.	81
Twine, English	5	do	do	65
Do	6	do	do	51
Do	7	do	do	47
Do	8	do	do	40
Hemp, Manilla, ton	\$60	\$25	\$25	42
Hemp, Jeute, ton	30	25	25	83

Prices of domestic goods last spring, present prices, and rise per cent.

American manufacture.

Description of goods.	Price last spring.	Present price.	Rise per cent.
Ticking—			
Amoskeag B	9½	12	26
Do. A	11½	14	22
Do. AaA	13	16	19
York	9	11	22
Drillings, brown—			
Perkins, Dwight	6½	8½	27
York, fine	8	9½	19
Indigo blue drillings	8½	10½	17
Plato prints	6	8	33
Do.	7	9	29
Do.	9	11	22
Fancy prints, 3 and 4 colors	10	12	20
Do. do.	11	14	27
Do. do.	13	16	23
Mixtures, cottonades, and all kinds of summer stuffs	-	-	25
Sattinets	-	-	25
Printing cloths	2½	3½	50
Do.	3½	5½	57
Do.	4½	6½	39
Brown sheetings—			
7-8 Boston	4½	6½	37
Massachusetts	6	6½	25
Laurence E	6	7½	25
Chicoppe D	6½	8	26
Cabot A	6½	8½	31
Laurence C	6½	8½	31
Bleached sheetings—			
Cabot C	5¾	7½	30
Great Falls S	6½	8½	35
Laurence H	6	7½	29
Do. G	6½	8½	30
Do. A	7½	9½	28
Do. B	10	11½	15
Dwight A	8½	10½	24
Merrimac B	8	9½	19
New York mills	12½	14	12
Hand 5-4	11	25	14
Flannels	-	-	25

N. B. That the low prices of last spring paid the manufacturers, is evident from the dividends; and the profits from their present monopoly can easily be calculated from the above table.

